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ABSTRACT. This article explores refugee economic subjectivity in the context of restrictive
asylum policies and disrupted transnational family lives. Drawing on fieldwork with
young Syrian refugees pursuing IT training in Jordan, I focus on the “coding boot
camp,” an emerging educational format in the field of refugee professional training. I
thus explore how Syrian youths approach humanitarian policies in which, in the absence
of full social and economic rights for refugees, the question of livelihoods is addressed
through the paradigms of self-reliance, creativity, and innovation. Reframing the refugee
from a “protected” to a “productive” subject, and offering individual solutions to a
structural economic impasse, these policies produce tensions between individual respon-
sibilities and more-than-individual relations and identifications—with families, religious
identities, and national communities—that remain unresolved. The findings contribute
to geographical scholarship on economic subjectivity, familial relations, and the migrant
and refugee condition, while shedding light on some of the effects of the encounter
between technology-centred, neoliberal approaches to humanitarianism and restrictive
migration regimes in responses to the Syrian displacement. Keywords: Syrian refugees,
Jordan, IT sector, humanitarian technology, subjectivity, family.
“Two minutes left to submit, two minutes left to submit. Please submit to:
Jordan@techfugees.com.” The competition at the second “Coder-Maker Hacka-
thon “ organized in the Jordanian capital, Amman, by the local branch of the
international nonprofit network Techfugees, was about to end. Rana and
Fatima, who would soon be proclaimed among the winners, approached me,
looking nervous and excited. For over two days, the two Syrian graduates,
trained as computer programmers by the organization ReBootKamp (RBK),
had worked as a close-knit team on their proposal, named “Waterwatch.” This
was a smartphone application helping users across Jordan to identify, locate,
and signal to local authorities leakages in the public water provision system,
thus addressing one of the major environmental and infrastructural problems
in the country. Together with another fourteen teams, Rana and Fatima, both
in their mid-twenties, had turned Amman’s Zinc Innovation Campus, owned
by the Kuwaiti mobile telecommunication company Zain, into the space where
the new technological frontier of global humanitarianism materialized into an
event: the hackaton. In the intensive two-day competition, young Syrian, Jorda-
nian, and Iraqi software engineers, entrepreneurs, social workers, artists, stu-
dents, and volunteers had applied their competence, creativity, and grit to
some of the most pressing challenges faced by refugees in Jordan, from
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education to livelihoods. Most of the “coders and makers” who had taken part
in the hackaton were refugees themselves. The jury included Mike Butcher, edi-
tor-at-large of Techcrunch Europe, a world-leading technology website.
In Jordan in 2017, the “Californian ideology” of Silicon Valley had entered
into an unlikely marriage with a humanitarian ethos reframed around the
imperatives of refugee self-reliance and entrepreneurship, a marriage which
Tom Scott-Smith (2015) defined as “humanitarian neophilia” (see also Bar-
brook and Cameron 1996). From the UNICEF’s Innovation Fund to the “Ideas
Box,” the mobile library designed by Librarians without Borders in use in the
community centers managed by the Danish Refugee Council, solutions to the
Syrian refugee crisis were sought—or claimed to be sought—primarily through
technology and the promotion of refugee entrepreneurship, with a particular
focus on women and youth. The shiny high-tech veneer, however, did not erase
the more concrete and long-lasting geopolitical preoccupations underpinning
international donors’ efforts directed towards Syrians in Jordan. As evidenced
by the Jordan Compact, the document adopted after the London conference on
Syria of 2016, the support to Syrian refugees’ livelihood and the attempts at
integrating them into the Jordanian economy, from agriculture to the garment
industry, had among their primary aims the promotion of stability, security,
and the prevention of irregular migration towards Europe (Council of Europe
2016). Since 2014, as the internationally praised open-door policy of Jordan had
taken an increasingly restrictive turn, leading to the borders with Syria being
shut in 2015, most Syrians had thus found themselves “stuck” in the Hashemite
Kingdom, getting by through precarious work, family savings (for those who
were better off), and transnational networks of social and financial support.
This article provides a critical reading of prevalent approaches to the ques-
tion of refugee education and work in the context of restrictive asylum policies
and disrupted transnational family lives. Focusing on the “coding boot camp,”
an emerging educational format in the field of ICT training targeting refugees,
it explores how young Syrians approach a humanitarian regime in which, in
the absence of full legal and social rights for refugees, the question of their
material and financial subsistence is addressed through the paradigms of self-
reliance, creativity, technological innovation, and entrepreneurship. I argue that
policies targeting refugees as individualized economic subjects are countered by
the intimately entangled family and community relations that characterize the
experience of refugeeness, both at a local and at a transnational level (Torres
and others 2016; Kallio, 2018; see also Hyndman 2001; Nagar and others 2002;
Mountz and Hyndman 2006). The findings expand upon recent geographical
and development scholarship that has explored the complex intersections of
neoliberal governmentality and subjectivity and the migrant and refugee condi-
tion. (Popke and Torres 2013; Ilcan and Rigyel 2015; Ehrkamp 2016; Torres and
others 2016; Wagner 2017; see also Bondi 2005; Sukarieh 2016). They also offer
a critical snapshot of humanitarian innovation “from below,” exploring the
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effects of a major policy trend on the lived experiences and family relations of
young Syrians in Jordan.
The article proceeds in four main parts. The first section describes the
international aid efforts and the development policies that have characterized
the reception of Syrian refugees in Jordan. In particular, it discusses the rise of
resilience, entrepreneurship, and technological skills training programs targeting
youths in the context of global shifts towards economic self-reliance in refugee
governance. The second section briefly reviews recent literature on economic
subjectivity in migration and refugee studies, with particular attention to the
tensions between neoliberal individualization, and family and communal life.
The following two sections discuss ethnographic and interview material col-
lected during four months of field research in Jordan, in 2017. In the conclu-
sions, I offer some reflections on the implications of the study for both refugee
and humanitarian governance and further research.
The article draws on ethnographic observation conducted during the open-
day events organized by the coding boot camp organization RBK in April-May
2017, in Amman, as well as during the two days of the Techfugees Jordan
Coder-Maker Hackaton, in May 2017. Ethnographic work involved both taking
part in the proposed activities, such as group discussions and basic coding
exercises, and hanging out and engaging in casual conversations with students
and perspective students. In addition to that, I examine eleven unstructured
interviews with both RBK staff and trainees, conducted in April-May 2017, and
shorter follow-up interviews with former RBK trainees, conducted in Septem-
ber 2017.1 Although I initially learned about RBK through a major international
nongovernmental organization (NGO) working on refugee protection in Jor-
dan, all of the people interviewed have been directly approached at the open
events organized by the company. As a Southern-European who has lived and
worked in the Middle East for several years, I shared some of the life trajecto-
ries of the young research participants—particularly experiences of graduate
unemployment and struggles to fund postgraduate studies and maintain
transnational family relations. While these did not erase the inequalities
between my condition of European expatriate and theirs as Syrian refugees in
Jordan, our shared class background and my choice to focus on the economic
sphere helped to bridge the gap between our positionalities, facilitating the
research encounter (see also Pascucci 2018).
REFUGEE ECONOMIES AND THE SYRIAN CRISIS: THE RISE OF THE TECH CAMP
The yellowish, majestic buildings and well-kept gardens of King Hussain Busi-
ness Park (KHBP), where the Zain Innovation Lab is located and fieldwork for
this article was conducted, occupy a large area on the western outskirts of cen-
tral Amman. Built initially as a military facility, the park is at the heart of Jor-
dan’s ICT ecosystem, one of the biggest in the Middle East with over 700
companies, with a total revenue of $682,204,679 (ICT Association in Jordan—
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INTAJ 2016). The park’s trajectory from a military site to a Special Economic
Zone (SEZ) devoted to hi-tech industries reflects the Hashemite Kingdom’s
aggressively neoliberalizing development policies under King Abdullah, in
which urban development has been mostly based on Public Private Partnership
(PPP; Bagaeen 2006). However, it is also emblematic of a trend that has
invested the wider Middle East since the early 2010s. KHBP is often described
as one the most important sites of the Arab “startup spring” (Ahmari 2015).
This is how fanciful developmental narratives qualified some of the economic
changes that occurred across the region in the aftermaths of the 2011 uprisings,
as the revolts were receding and stability was being restored, in some cases by
military juntas.
Syria, however, remained a significant exception in this alleged landscape of
technology, entrepreneurship, and manu militari–secured stability. As the coun-
try plunged further into war, by the end of 2016 the so-called Middle Eastern
“startup spring” had intersected with what, according to the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), was the biggest refugee crisis in
the world, with over 5.4 million people having left Syria since 2011 (UNHCR
2017). Jordan, a country with no formal domestic asylum legislation, whose
refugee policies are regulated only by a Memorandum of Understanding
(MOU) with the UNHCR, was hosting over 600,000 displaced Syrians, as well
as the largest refugee camp in the Middle East, Zaatari. A rapidly urbanizing
conglomerate of prefabricated temporary housing and tents in the middle of
the desert, about an hour from Amman, at the time of writing Zaatari was
home to around 78,500 people. Approximately another 36,600 refugees were in
the Azraq camp, in the Zarqa governorate, while a few thousand more were
lodged in small camps like Murijep al Fhoud, funded by the United Arab Emi-
rates. The vast majority of Syrians in Jordan, however, had settled autono-
mously in the major urban areas, including Amman.
As already remarked, securing the livelihoods of refugees in Jordan beyond
the reliance on humanitarian assistance, while preventing irregular movement,
soon became of paramount importance for international donors. In turn, the
Jordanian government saw in the global concern about Syrian refugees a poten-
tial chance for economic development. Through the Jordan Compact, approved
during the London conference on Syria of 2016, the international community
promised around $2 billion in aid and investment for Jordan. The European
Union also revised its preferential rules of origin, facilitating the export of
products manufactured in Jordan, especially in the garment industry (Lenner
and Turner 2018). Jordan committed to issue 200,000 work permits for Syrians,
and to ease international investment in five SEZs. While the actual impact of
these measures remains questionable (ILO 2017; Lenner and Turner 2018),
international organizations and NGOs were quick to switch their agenda from
emergency relief to development, as many officers confirmed during interviews
in Amman. Places like KHBP thus opened their doors to refugees and
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humanitarian organizations. In a speech given at the University of California
Berkeley in 2014, King Abdullah had identified in “private-sector creativity”
and ICTs as “key” to the Jordanian national interest in creating “jobs—good
jobs—especially for young people, the majority of our population.” Hopes were
rising high about the tech sector offering opportunities for young Syrians to
express their talent and, in the process, develop Jordan.2
The international community’s concern with the labor and economic lives
of refugees is hardly new. Evan Easton-Calabria remarks how the question of
work and livelihoods has been central in international refugee aid at least since
the immediate aftermaths of the First World War (2015). The UNHCR Liveli-
hoods Unit, established in 2008, identifies as its main tools and objectives “vo-
cational and skills training, promoting entrepreneurship, supporting
agriculture, livestock and fisheries, and strengthening access to financial services
or microfinance” (UNHCR 2014, 14, as cited in Easton-Calabria 2015, 431).
While today frequently labelled as “innovations,” most of these practices date
back to nearly a century (Easton-Calabria 2015). Structures and implementation
might have changed, but practices like “revolving funds,” more recently repack-
aged as “microfinance,” have been around for several decades (Easton-Calabria
2015).
The “Whole of Syria” approach to the coordination of humanitarian emer-
gency responses to Syrian refugees,” outlined in the 2015 Strategic Response
Plan (SRP), is not exempt from this iteration (Ilcan and Rygiel 2015, 337). The
plan’s objective of strengthening “livelihoods and early recovery” is based on
resilience-promotion, community self-reliance, and a decentred governance in
which implementation is carried out through an extensive network of partners.
Refugees are thus recast from “passive recipients of aid” to “having the poten-
tial to be transformed into responsible, resilient subjects who survive through
crisis” (Ilcan and Rygiel 2015, 337). While actual refugee participation in policy
formulation and planning remain elusive (Easton-Calabria 2015) the responsi-
bility for surviving and recovering from crises, especially from an economic
point of view, is individualized. Coupled with the technological entrepreneur-
ship narratives promoted through, among others, the UNHCR Innovation ini-
tiative, the “humanitarian emergency governance under neoliberalism” (Ilcan
and Rygiel, 2015, 343) characterizing the Syria SRP is but the latest development
in a long history of governing displacement by making refugees economically
viable.
REFUGEE ECONOMIC SUBJECTIVITY
Despite the growing policy attention to livelihoods and economies, existing
critical scholarship tends to see the figure of the refugee as having no relation
with global and localised class structures, modes of production, and political
economies (Rajaram, 2018). As a consequence, refugee economic subjectivity—
understood here as “the multiple positionalities and intentionalities that infuse
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individual experience” (Rankin, 2011, 28) and that can be ascribed to the eco-
nomic sphere—tends to be scarcely explored. As Gatrell’s work on “the making
of the modern refugee” has highlighted, the lack of attention to the economic
sphere is at risk of “stripping away attributes of social distinction and class”
from refugee subjects (2013, 43, quoted in Ehrkamp 2016, 814). Across the social
sciences, with the exception of recent contributions in political economy (Wag-
ner 2017; Rajaram 2018, among others), work on refugee subjectivity focuses
primarily on performativity in the context of the asylum process (such as
Lacroix, 2004; Rivetti 2013; Luker, 2015). In geography, recurring themes are
border securitization, and the gendered and sexualized categories through
which contemporary asylum is governed (see also Szczepanikova 2010; Hynd-
man and Giles 2011).
Critical geographical studies on refugee subjectivity have followed a similar
trajectory as those focusing on the camp and its spatialities. Literature on the
camp moved from the nearly unquestioned dominance of Agambenian
approaches, with their exclusive focus on reduction to bare life within spaces of
exception, to more ethnographically inspired, materialistic, and postcolonial
readings that have accounted for the political and cultural life that takes place
within spaces of refuge (Sanyal 2012; Ramadan 2013; Sanyal 2013). In a similar
vein, analyses of refugee subjectivity have moved beyond the focus on the per-
vasive “grammar of domination” (Rivetti, 2013, 306) that would determine the
self-government of the refugee subject in institutions of asylum. This has led to
the emergence of more nuanced accounts of the myriad agentic capacities and
contextual negotiations involved in the experience of refugeeness, also when
the latter unfolds in spaces of liminality and waiting (Dyck and McLaren, 2004;
Szczepanikova 2010; Ehrkamp, 2016; H€akli and others 2017). As Ehrkamp notes,
this body of work has been essential in exposing global processes that have the
effect of “de-subjectifying refugees by placing them into unexamined cate-
gories” and “individualizing them by demanding particular identity perfor-
mances” (2016, 818–819). Such nuanced accounts of agency, positionality, and
relationality are essential for a critical assessment of prevalent approaches to
refugee economies.
Contextuality and relationality feature prominently in discussions of eco-
nomic subjectivity within critical migration geographies, which, unlike refugee
studies, have paid significant attention to the topic. Here, the influence of femi-
nist geographies has led to particularly interesting contributions. Drawing on
Hyndman’s proposal for a feminist geopolitics (2001), Torres and others (2016,
404) theorize an approach to economic change in which mobility is used as a
tool for “dissecting” and countering geopolitical and geoeconomic power. This
is achieved primarily by focusing on the everyday, and bridging the gap
between the global and the intimate in the study of economic processes. Fol-
lowing Liz Bondi’s (2005) warning about the paradoxical and politically pro-
ductive effects of the neoliberal emphasis on individual agency, Popke and
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Torres highlight how, for migrants, neoliberal change is “not an imposition,
but a negotiation,” producing effects that are “locally variant” (2013, 225).
In this regard, family and community relations are significant. In studies of
migrants’ economic subjectivity, conducts aimed at safeguarding “family inter-
ests” have often been interpreted as a product of neoliberal models of develop-
ment (Popke and Torres 2013). Yet, as Popke and Torres argue, family
interests “can be pursued in different ways, some of which might enhance the
visions of individual agency, whereas others suggest a more collective under-
standing of the social” (2013, 220). As this article will show, refugees’ intimate
and family relations constitute spaces where “more-than-individual forms of
engagement” with economic relations can happen (Harker 2010, 2625; see also
Nash 2005; Valentine 2008; Harker 2012; Kallio 2018). As such, while some of
their oppressively gendered aspects are reproduced, they are also sites where
models of refugee protection based on the imperatives of self-reliance,
entrepreneurship, and competition are challenged. These are “filtered through
existing forms of community and reciprocity,” and their hold is questioned by
the experiences of precarity (as insecurity produced and distributed through
social and economic relations), but also of embodied connectivity that charac-
terize migrancy and refugeeness (Popke and Torres 2013, 226; see also Harker,
2010, 2012).
Considering economic life as strictly intertwined with the multifaceted
agencies and positionalities that characterize the refugee condition, in what fol-
lows I approach the question of economic subjectivity by putting young Syri-
ans’ experiences of professional training and work in the tech sector in the
constrained context of their refugee family life. Here, economies are not seen
as simply “a mode of exchange”, but as “mediated by social values and hierar-
chies” (Rajaram 2018, p. 1). Their spatialized dimensions involve first and fore-
most the space of the “tech camp”, but also family as a social and geographical
space that is lived both intimately and transnationally, as well as the multiple
scales of the globalized securitization of borders and asylum policies.
THE PROMISE OF THE CODING BOOT CAMP
This new form of education training called “coding boot camp” could take
somebody from zero to hero in twelve weeks! You take a bus driver who’s
making $40,000 a year to software engineer in twelve weeks, and he’s making
$120,000. . . (RBK manager and cofounder, Amman, 2017)
The enthusiastic words of one of the founders of the Jordanian-American
organization RBK reflect those of U.S. President Barack Obama who, in 2016,
defined the “coding boot camp,” an intensive, immersive educational format
for training in computer programming, usually offered by private companies,
as “a ticket to the middle class” (Wilson, 2017, 67). That year, companies like
the Flatiron School in New York and San Francisco-based Hack Reactor, with
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their ambition of competing with formal college education in computer
science, had started to attract media attention in the United States (Wilson,
2017, 67). Their luring promise was not only about professional training, but
also success and social mobility.
Founded in Jordan in December 2014, RBK—the only coding boot camp in
the Arab world according to its website—offers a sixteen-week program in
computer programming that is modelled on the Hack Reactor curriculum.
While the program is open to both Jordanians and foreigners living in Jordan,
many of its students are refugees. Besides private donors, the organization
developed in collaboration with the UNHCR and the United Nations Develop-
ment Program (UNDP), and has enjoyed a successful partnership with the lat-
ter that has allowed many young Syrians, Iraqis, and Yemenis to receive
scholarships and loans covering the 5,700 JD (US$8,040) fee. At the time when
fieldwork for this paper was conducted, none of the Syrian refugees I met who
were enrolled for the training was paying fees—they all benefited from bur-
saries. The Danish Refugee Council also features among the RBK partners. This
highlights the convergence of national economic and humanitarian rationalities
that frame the work of education start-ups, NGOs, and social enterprises in
Jordan. The Hashemite Kingdom sees international donors’ support for refugee
livelihoods as an opportunity for national development, and is adamant in pur-
suing its “Jordanians first” approach: internationally funded aid and develop-
ment programs must benefit Jordanians too, and the employment of
noncitizens remains strictly regulated. As this article will show, the implications
of this approach for young Syrians’ education and professional perspectives are
significant.
Applicants to the RBK training are typically admitted after attending a ser-
ies of introductory events and a standard questionnaire-based interview. The
main entry requirements are motivational: commitment to the training and
willingness to work in the Jordanian IT sector upon completion. Personality
and attitudes are also regarded as very important. While most of the Syrian,
but also Jordanian, Iraqi, and Yemeni students I met while conducting field-
work for this paper had completed at least secondary school, and many had a
university degrees, formal education is not regarded as essential. The full-stack,
Javascript-based curriculum offered is rather broad, and includes introductory
data structures and algorithm training, making it accessible to candidates with
different backgrounds. English-language entry requirements are also relatively
low, even though reaching fluency in English is considered an essential objec-
tive of the program.
RBK has in common with its U.S. equivalents the ambition to act as a “dis-
ruptor” to the local formal education system (Skonnard 2015). In the interviews
I had with the RBK management and trainers, secondary schools and universi-
ties in Jordan were depicted as excessively hierarchical and based on pedagogies
that do not foster free, critical thinking and individual creativity. Although
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such critiques are not entirely debased, and the views expressed by the RBK
staff were generally nuanced, such perceptions of formal, public education res-
onated with the generalizing negative assessment of local and Syrian graduates
by humanitarian and development professionals in Jordan. These were depicted
as having few, if any, marketable skills, and being burdened by a sense of enti-
tlement that led them to expect to find a guaranteed, stable job without much
effort, possibly in state bureaucracies—a sweeping judgement that often
sounded like a start-up era version of Syed Hussein Alatas’s (1977) famous
“myth of the lazy native” (see also Rajaram, 2018).
The solution to this alleged impasse offered by the RBK coding boot camp
is individual, and consists of making young refugees (and unemployed Jordani-
ans) desirable employees in an aspirational emerging new economy. This trans-
formation is achieved by combining a culturally specific version of the Silicon
Valley work culture with humanitarian practices and values. As already
remarked, in the boot camp the main emphasis is on motivation and soft skills.
According to the organization’s own website, the latter include “communica-
tion, collaboration, ethics, professionalism, autonomous (self) learning skills,
problem solving skills and critical thinking skills.” Moreover, as far as the tech-
nical training is concerned, the camp open-source pedagogy utilizes “agile prin-
ciples: sprint learning, peer-based learning, problem-based learning, fail-based
learning, heavily-facilitated learning, psycho-social support” (interview with
RBK manager, Amman, 2017).
Interpersonal skills and psychological traits are thus essential to, and strictly
entwined with, the experience of “learning to code.” Empathy and “emotional
intelligence” are regarded as essential skills for employability in the IT job mar-
ket. Alongside more conventional forms of work on the self, such as regular
individual and group counselling with a trained psychologist, the boot camp
thus provides several spaces and opportunities for less-structured interaction.
RBK’s trainees daily schedule involves an early start with a shared breakfast,
provided by the organization, followed by coding challenges aimed at develop-
ing group-oriented problem-solving skills. Then comes practice to be carried
out in pairs, which is considered important to develop accountability and
responsibility to partners. The generous lunch break is then followed by an
hour of “screen-free time,” which the students are strongly encouraged to
devote to physical exercise. In the evening, after a light dinner consumed all
together, there are usually other planned activities, ranging from simple social
outings and gatherings to meetings with perspective employers. In general,
mimicking Silicon Valley’s long-hours work culture, students are encouraged—
or at least not discouraged—to stay and continue “hacking” well into the night.
In this regard, RBK is an example of how, also in the lives of those who are
marginally included in global capitalism (Rajaram, 2018), such as young refu-
gees in a peripheral country, “neoliberalism ‘unmakes’ boundaries such as
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between work and ‘time-out,’ entrepreneurism and self-care” (Fixsen and
others 2017, 13, see also Knudsen and Swedberg 2009 and Patel 2010).
Great value is also attributed to the students’ ability to live and work in a
diverse environment showing liberal, tolerant, and nonpatriarchal attitudes.
Engaging in excessive and disrespectful “man-splaining,” one of the managers
and trainers said, could easily be a reason not to be allowed to complete the
program. Stories such as those of conservative Muslim male students “who had
never talked to a woman who wasn’t a family member” before enrolling for the
training, and had then to quickly learn to work in close collaboration with
female colleagues of different backgrounds, were recounted with pride. “If you
discriminate on the basis of religion, ethnicity, tribal name, gender identity. . ..
you’re in trouble here,” was the comment of one of the organization’s foun-
ders. The training thus explicitly demanded a deep and all-encompassing trans-
formation, one very much centered around the notion of self-growth.
In Foucault’s reading of Marx, “technologies of production” and “technolo-
gies of the self” work in “constant interaction” and “every technique of produc-
tion requires modification of individual conduct—not only skills but also
attitudes” (1988, 18). As a professional training space, the tech camp works pre-
cisely by promoting this close interaction of technologies of productive disci-
pline and self-improvement. Historically, the boot camp is a format associated
with youth, military, and correctional regimes (Wilson, 2017). The educational
and therapeutic dimensions of work and training are thus inextricably linked
to the experience of spatial and temporal immersion. The camp is a self-con-
tained space where trainees study, work, play, eat together, and, in some cases,
sleep in the same rooms, “leaving everything behind,” as one of the RBK train-
ers explained, for sixteen weeks. At the RBK open events in spring 2017, it was
not uncommon to hear former students of the programme describe the boot
camp as “life-changing.” Several graduates expressed particular appreciation for
the professional counselling offered by the organization. This framing of the
camp as a juvenile “rite of passage,” a turning point in one’s personal growth
and quest for individual autonomy highlights some of the political tensions in
employment policies specifically targeting young refugees. As Sukarieh and
Tannock note, at a global level, policy interest in youth is “directly linked to
the global rise and spread of neoliberal forms of capitalism” (2016, 1286). As a
policy category, they write, youth has “individualist, universalist and function-
alist ties with notions of personal development and growth” that have made it
an attractive alternative to “other, more collectivist, conflictual and politicized
social identities and categories of class, race, nation and religion” (Sukarieh
and Tannock 2016, 1286).
As the next section will show, however, for the young people involved,
renouncing—or sidelining—collective identifications and sources of informal
protection such as extended family and religion, when at all possible, did not
necessarily amount to a form of emancipation and positive autonomy. Rather,
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it meant being left alone to face an increasingly securitized global refugee
regime, and a scant and ruthless labor market.
ECONOMIC FAMILY SPACES
Yes, I did complete the training. . . Well, here we are. There are no jobs, so we
continue to study. . .—RBK graduate, female, from Syria, Amman, 2017
We are all here because there are no jobs, right? I think we all agree on that.
There are no jobs. —participant in the Techfugees Coder-Maker Hackaton,
male, from Syria, Amman 2017
At the RBK “Meet & Greet” event, an open day held in Amman’s KHBP in
April 2017 to allow perspective students to meet staff and alumni of the coding
boot camp, unemployment was an experience shared by all the participants.
None of the young Syrians met—nearly all having a university degree, mostly
from an urban middle-class background—had joined to improve their “career
perspectives”: rather, they were there “to find a job,” as they put it. The differ-
ence in language denotes an important difference in attitudes and expectations.
Most of them felt they had no chances of actual professional success, no matter
what kind of degrees they held. The best they could hope for, if they were
lucky, was finding decent work to support themselves and their families.
Such feelings were not without reason. As already mentioned, having no
international legal obligations to refugees’ social and economic rights, Jordan
has very restrictive rules as to their access to the job market. Although these
were partially mitigated by the Jordan Compact’s commitment to issue work
permits to Syrians, in 2017 access to qualified sectors of the job markets
remained almost exclusively reserved to Jordanian citizens (see Lenner and
Turner 2018). Among other things, this meant that non-Jordanian RBK gradu-
ates, including all the young Syrians I met while conducting research for this
paper, could only find employment through consultancy schemes, and not
through regular work contracts. Coupled with Jordan’s structurally high unem-
ployment rates, RBK perspective students’ grim outlook on the future appeared
thus rather realistic.
Two months after completing the training, RBK alumna Mariam—”one of
the technically most gifted coders we have ever trained,” as one of the members
of staff described her—had had job interviews at two different IT companies,
but she was still waiting to hear back from them. At 27, she was looking for a
job that would allow her to economically support her family of origin. Like
Mariam, RBK students who were praised for their technical talent seemed to
embrace the values of self-development and entrepreneurship proposed to them
through the training. However, even in such cases professional and economic
success was not conceived as a merely individual endeavour. Commitments
and responsibilities towards parents, siblings, spouses, future children, friends,
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and neighbours were often the main reasons to train as a coder and improve
one’s chances to find a good job. While the training proposed empathy, active
listening, and collaboration as tools for personal growth and success, most of
the young people I spoke to considered individual success as a way to build
materially grounded and intimately connected relations of familiality and com-
munal care.
Aya, the youngest daughter of a devout Muslim family, also an RBK
alumna in search of a job, described her responsibilities towards the family as
follows:
The first job interview I had after the training was a complete mess. Yes, sure,
at RBK we get to do mock job interviews, but still. . . I am going to try again,
sure. My family has already supported me throughout my undergraduate
degree, they have done so much for me. I cannot ask them to do it again for a
master. I would like to do a master in engineering, but first I would like to
work for a bit, help my parents, save some money and then pay for it myself.3
(. . .) I cannot go abroad to study, because the government won’t let me come
back to Jordan again to see my family. And I cannot travel alone, especially
not abroad. That would not be acceptable for my family. I am not allowed to
spend the night outside, for instance here in Amman at RBK. So. . . well, that’s
how it is. I am just going to look for a job and do my master here, in Jordan.
The modality through which Aya provided support to her parents—staying
at home and compromising, rather than moving out to look for better job
opportunities—were highly gendered. Nevertheless, essentialising her choices as
a mere sign of patriarchal family structures curtailing the individual freedom
and career prospects of a young woman would not do justice to the complex
web of relations of care and shared responsibility that constituted her social
self. Such a move should be avoided not only because, in the context of family
in the Middle East, it is clearly ridden with Orientalistic and culturally deter-
ministic fallacies (Harker, 2010), but also because it obscures the complex eco-
nomic relations and subjectivities that characterize the refugee condition. As
highlighted by the discussion of her plans for postgraduate studies after the
RBK training, Aya was moved by feelings of gratitude and reciprocity that led
her to carefully negotiate, rather than simply suppress, her individual
aspirations.
Sukarieh considers class to be the central factor leading poor young Jorda-
nians to privilege community and family relations over personal affirmation,
resisting the individualizing ethos of entrepreneurship underpinning develop-
ment programs (2016). The case of RBK trainees and perspective students,
shows how migrancy and refugeeness also produce specific configurations of
precarity that embed economic aspirations, negotiations, and practices into the
intimate and the familial. As Harker has shown, in context of military occupa-
tion, conflict, and displacement, practices of “getting by” spanning education,
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urbanization and mobility “are not simply enabled by family, but are them-
selves family practices and spacings” (2010, 2635).
The refugee students approached the technologies of individualization and
self-discipline upon which the RBK training was based with flexible scepticism.
During my last visit to Amman, in September 2017, I asked some of the trai-
nees I had met months earlier to update me about their employment situation.
Some of those who were by then at work explained how they had refused some
of the offers they had previously received, or only worked for few weeks with
certain companies, and then left. The reasons were mostly related to them not
liking the way coworkers and managers treated them, or refusing to work an
excessive amount of extra hours. Similar decisions are in contrast with the tech
camp’s ethics of extreme flexibility and low boundaries between personal and
professional life. For some of the trainees, embracing cosmopolitan and liberal
lifestyles and values in order to find a job was also controversial. While trying
their best to “adapt,” some expressed their desire to stick to the conservative
values that they shared with their families and communities.
Syrian youths thus carefully deployed their strategic agency to navigate the
variegated training and study opportunities offered by education start-ups, UN,
international NGOs, and Jordanian charities close to the Hashemite govern-
ment. Hanan was a refugee in her thirties with a civil engineering degree from
a public university. By the time we met at the RBK event, her degree was
already over five years old, and it had never been put to use, first because of
war, then because of internal displacement. After her father’s death, Hanan’s
family had finally relocated to Jordan, hoping to find some stability and per-
haps a chance for resettlement to a third country through the UNHCR pro-
gram, for which they had applied. Meanwhile, Hanan was trying other ways,
both to improve her employment perspectives in Jordan, and to get a visa to
travel abroad. Rather than engaging in a mere “timepass” in the absence of
more meaningful ways to spend her time in Jordan (Wagner, 2017), Hanan, like
most of the refugee youths at RBK, was looking for another piece in the puzzle
of her family’s precarious middle-class livelihood.
As Hanan’s experience shows, mobility is often the most challenging aspect
of this puzzle. Like her, several other RBK graduates and students had applied
for resettlement through the UNHCR, together with their families. 25-year old
Hoda, a degree in computer sciences and three years of unemployment in Jor-
dan before joining RBK, explained how legal and administrative obstacles
meant that, ultimately, leaving Jordan seemed like the only viable option to
achieve some stability:
We cannot have a driving licence here. . . Syrians cannot have a driving licence
in this country. It’s understandable, the streets are already crowded, there are
already many cars. . . and many Syrians, imagine if they all wanted to drive
their car! (Laughs.) Still. There are restrictions, problems everywhere. There is
that restriction, and work permits restrictions, and there are no safe ways, no
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opportunities to travel or leave Jordan. . . Eventually the easiest way to travel
for Syrians is. . . how it is called? Relocation? I mean, through the UN.
Ali, from Damascus, also had a university degree in computer science.
When we met, he had been in Jordan for four years. He had arrived together
with his family, but after a while his father had decided to go back to the Syr-
ian capital. A few months later, Ali’s mother was thinking about leaving Syria
again. As he admitted, Ali had no idea where he would end up settling, nor
how the Syrian war would end:
There are all those rumours about partition (of the country). . .. I don’t really
believe them. But we have seen all sorts of things. I have no idea where all
those weapons even came from, where things like imposing hijab (Islamic
headscarf) on Christian women did come from. (. . .) If I don’t find a job here,
I will be going to. . . (Smiles). What other options do I have, apart from the
sea? I thought about crossing the sea from Turkey many times. I have many
friends who did it. They are now in Germany. Some of them went through
Libya, via Egypt.
The central and eastern Mediterranean routes featured often in the familial
histories of the young Syrian software engineers. In 2014, Magid and his family
had arrived in Egypt from Lebanon, where they had at first sought safety from
the violence in Syria. In Cairo, Magid had worked for a shopping assistant for
about eight months. Disappointed and increasingly frustrated with the little
future perspectives that life in Egypt seemed to offer, and being lucky enough
to be able to count on some financial support from his family, Magid has fol-
lowed his aspirations and moved to Amman to enrol first for a scientific degree
at the University of Jordan, and then for the RBK training. A few months after
his arrival to Jordan, his two brothers who had remained in Egypt had decided
to seek refuge in Europe, travelling to Italy via sea.
They just took a boat to Europe. It took them twelve days to reach their desti-
nation. Twelve days in which I felt. . . it was the longest days in my life. No
sleep, no eating until I heard back from them again. Yes, smugglers would tell
people that it takes much shorter, but it takes at least ten days to cross the
Mediterranean there. At least. [. . .] My parents? No, my parents didn’t travel
that way. You can’t send older people, your parents, on a dangerous field trip
like that. It is not appropriate for them.
Magid’s vivid account of the feelings experienced during his brothers’ jour-
ney highlight the constrained, precarious, but also binding relations that consti-
tute refugee family spaces. While Magid’s decision to move to Jordan was also
determined by his own individual aspirations, both his and his brothers’ trajec-
tories of mobility were part of a transnational configuration of care and inter-
subjective responsibility. Once Magid’s brothers had made it to their final
destination, Germany, and received asylum there, they had rapidly applied for
family reunification, getting their parents to travel to Europe safely. Like many
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of the young people enrolling for the training offered by RBK, they were thus
hoping to find “good work” that would allow them to support members of
their extended family and communities in Syria and in neighbouring countries.
Their economic selves were deeply embedded in relations aimed at countering
the precarity produced by displacement and migration and refugee governance.
CONCLUSIONS
Some of the young refugees I met while conducting research for this article
benefited from the RBK training and, albeit through the precarious expedient
of temporary consultancy contracts, managed to find paid work in the Jorda-
nian tech start-up sector. For some, like Fatima and Rana, the winners of the
Techfugees competition mentioned in the introduction to this article, the bene-
fit was particularly significant. In a context of widespread socio-legal precarity
and growing economic inequality, initiatives like RBK, which foster agency and
autonomy rather than reinforcing narratives of victimhood, should not be
easily dismissed (see Ehrkamp, 2016).
Yet this article has also shown the gap between the tech camp’s narratives
of success and the lived experience of young refugees in Jordan. Actual, “de-
cent” work remains scarce, legal access to it extremely limited, and young mid-
dle-class Syrians in Jordan are thoroughly aware of it. As Linda Herrera has
eloquently put it, before growing evidence of the limits of start-up and
entrepreneurship models, when not accompanied by initiatives aimed at more
structural change, “it is unfair and disingenuous to propagate the myth that
anyone with an idea, grit and determination” can be economically successful
(2017, 42). To promise success in the IT sector to young women and men who
are stuck in a country that does not even allow them to get a driving licence,
with very few options for international travel besides deadly dangerous, irregu-
lar migration via sea, seems incongruous at the very least.
That these youths would rather stick with their families as sources of eco-
nomic, social, and moral support should thus come as no surprise. Neverthe-
less, while showing how refugee family life can act as a disruptor to neoliberal
developmental discourses and practices, it is important to avoid “reaffirming or
naturalizing particularly powerful (and thus pervasive) discursive norms around
intimate relations” as articulated through the nuclear, heteronormative family
(Harker 2010, 2637). For the trainees interviewed for this article, “more than
individual” subjectivities in family contexts were not necessarily synonymous of
happy and shared—let alone emancipatory—life choices. To the contrary, their
decisions often involved laborious negotiations of gendered expectations and
parental impositions. Suffice it to think about how “taking care of the family”
resulted in completely different decisions for Aya and Magid; while the former,
as a woman, felt she would be better able to help her loved ones by living at
her parents’ place, for the latter honouring his family responsibilities meant
going abroad to study and work.
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The point here is not to idealise refugee families as sites of resistance to
neoliberal development. Rather, it is to show the inadequacies and contradic-
tions of a model of economic integration targeting young refugees with pro-
mises of individual success, while actually offering little or no security, in a
global context of shrinking budgets for international aid and increasingly
restrictive migration policies. Encouraging young middle-class Syrians to
embrace competition in the local labor market, the tech camp—despite its nar-
ratives of full employment and flexible, cool middle-class ascendance—risks
creating winners and losers, producing further inequalities where family ties
and communal belonging have already been stretched or torn apart (see Dolan
and Rajak 2016).
This article has shown how little young Syrian software engineers actually
engaged with the subject position of the brilliant, successful coder—the start-
up economy winner. Instead, it was the needs of more vulnerable members of
their families and communities—aging parents, unemployed siblings, and the
like—that shaped the decisions they made in their economic lives. Livelihood
policies that fail to take into account how the economic agency of refugees in
precarious socio-legal conditions is embedded in familial relations of care,
reciprocity, and responsibility are deemed to have limited effects. As the inter-
views in this article demonstrate, such relations are moral, affective, and
transnational, but also binding in their material implications. The professional
and economic choices that made sense for my Syrian interlocutors, be they
women or men, were those that were functional within their family and com-
munity relational space, and not simply those that maximised their individual
success in the IT sector.
Finally, while this article has focused on a specific ethnographic case,
some of the questions addressed point to phenomena that are global in scale,
and increasingly relevant for refugee geographies. These include solutions to
complex socio-political crises sought through technological innovation and
the involvement of corporate actors and corporate governance tools in
humanitarian delivery. The uneven results of these processes call for further
engagements with the question of refugee economic subjectivity, engagements
which should be simultaneously attuned to the embodied and intimate
dimensions of the economic everyday and to the transnationality of global
processes.
NOTES
1 While Rana and Fatima, the winners of the Techfugees Jordan 2017 competition mentioned
in this introduction, are referred to by their real names, in the case of all other participants, out
of respect for the intimacy of their personal and family lives, names have been changed and
other identifiers omitted.
2 http://jordanembassyus.org/news/remarks-his-majesty-king-abdullah-ii-innovative-jordan-
conference-university-california (accessed October 2018).
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3 Public higher education is not free in Jordan, and tuition fees for technical and scientific
degrees can be rather high.
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